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Abstract
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided
matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving un-
ravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that
the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more sim-
ilar preferences. It also shows that any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling,
and that the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling.
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1 Introduction
Hiring policy is one of the most important determinants of a ﬁrm’s success. The hiring process calls
for collecting information in order to choose the best individual from among the candidates. In
certain markets, however, ﬁrms hire workers long before all the pertinent information is available.
For instance, in the market for hospital interns before 1945, appointments have been made even as
early as two years before students’ graduation and the actual start of the job (Roth, 1984, 2003). A
similar situation still exists in the market for federal court clerks.1 This phenomenon of contracting
long before the job begins and before relevant information is available, is called unravelling. Those
early matches often turn out to be ineﬃcient when the job starts.
Unravelling has been recognized as a serious problem in numerous markets.2 Measures designed
to preclude this phenomenon (such as centralized clearinghouses and enforcement of uniform hiring
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1According to Haruvy, Roth and Unver (2006), “63% of responding judges said that they had completed their
clerkship hiring [for jobs beginning in 2002] by the end of January, 2000, in contrast to only 17% who had completed
their hiring by January the previous year.”
2Examples include entry-level law and medical markets, postseason college football bowls, and fraternity and
sorority rushes. For a more extensive list, see Roth and Xing (1994).
1dates) have not always been successful. Unravelling prevails in certain markets because some
employers see a better chance to hire their most-preferred candidates when they contract early
than when they wait. Meanwhile, other markets for entry-level professionals appear never to have
experienced unravelling, including markets for new professors in ﬁnance, economics and biology.
Studying what factors lead to unravelling in some markets but not in others is necessary for designing
better measures to prevent unravelling in markets prone to it.
Much of the existing research focuses on stability as the key to understanding unravelling. A
matching is ex-post stable if every agent prefers his match to being unmatched, and if there is no
blocking pair, that is, a worker and a ﬁrm that both strictly prefer each other to their assigned
partners. Roth (1991) and Kagel and Roth (2000) argue that ex-post stable matching implemented
upon arrival of pertinent information should preclude early contracting under uncertainty. This
argument — known as the “stability hypothesis” (Roth, 1991) — is based mainly on the observation
that implementing ex-post stable matching through a clearinghouse3 stopped unravelling in the US
and UK medical markets. However, some clearinghouses with an ex-post stable algorithm have failed
to stop unravelling. Examples include the U.S. gastroenterology market, whose clearinghouse was
abandoned in 1996 (Niederle and Roth, 2003a), and the Canadian market for new lawyers, where
a large number of ﬁrms contract with students a year before graduation despite a clearinghouse
(Roth and Xing, 1994). Roth and Xing (1994) also oﬀer theoretical examples of unravelling even
when ex-post stable matching is expected upon the arrival of pertinent information. There is no
consensus, however, what drives those examples — what are the reasons for the stability hypothesis
to fail; that is, for a clearinghouse with ex-post stable algorithm to unravel.4
Despite extensive discussion in the economics literature, we have only limited understanding of
why unravelling occurs in some markets but not in others. And the basic question of what are
the potentials and limitations of mechanisms designed for markets where unravelling is possible
remains largely unexplored. This paper investigates both issues: the causes of unravelling, and
mechanism design. The existing literature on unravelling had not considered the relevance of
similarity of preferences. This paper shows that the similarity of preferences is an important factor
contributing to unravelling. The more similar are ﬁrms’ preferences, the more unravelling will
occur in the market. This provides a reason for the stability hypothesis to fail: high similarity of
preferences may cause an ex-post stable matching mechanism to unravel. This paper also shows
that unravelling leads to a loss in welfare, and a mechanism must preclude unravelling to be Pareto-
optimal. Moreover, for any market, there exists a Pareto-optimal mechanisms, which does not
unravel. In markets where ex-post stable mechanism unravels, there exist unstable mechanisms
that do not unravel, Pareto-improve on the ex-post stable mechanism and achieve Pareto-optimal
outcome.
This paper examines a two-sided matching market populated by ﬁrms on one side and workers
on the other. The agents on each side are heterogenous and they have preferences over agents on
3In a clearinghouse, ﬁrms and workers submit their preferences, and a matching among all participants is produced
by an algorithm.
4The stability hypothesis is not the only explanation of unravelling in the literature. Other factors contributing
to unravelling are congestion (Roth and Xing, 1997), exploding oﬀers (Niederle and Roth, 2004), shocks in supply
and demand (Niederle and Roth, 2003b). In Damiano, Li and Suen (2005), early contracting is the result of costly
search. Li and Rosen (1998), Li and Suen (2000) and Suen (2000) point to workers’ risk aversion as the main cause
of the phenomenon. This paper analyzes another — previously unexplored — factor contributing to unravelling:
similarity of preference.
Although risk aversion plays an important role and may be an additional cause of early contracting, it is not a
necessary condition for the phenomenon. The model in this paper assumes risk-neutrality in order to distinguish
incentives to unravel driven by similarity of preferences from those attributable to risk aversion.
2the other side of the market. Their aim is to match with the best possible agent on the other
side. Workers’ preferences over ﬁrms are identical: all workers agree on which ﬁrm is the best
ﬁrm, the next-to-best or the worst ﬁrm. Firms, however, may have diﬀerent preferences over the
workers. The similarity of ﬁrms’ preferences over workers is a comparative statics parameter; two
extreme cases are independent and identical preferences, although intermediate levels of similarity
are also explored. There are two periods. Firms and workers can contract in either period, but ﬁrms
only learn their preferences in the second period. The ﬁrms and workers who contract in the ﬁrst
period exit the market. The agents who remain in the second period participate in a mechanism
that produces a matching between them. In this model, contracting during the ﬁrst period, before
ﬁrms have learned their preferences, constitutes unravelling. Such early contracting takes place
when a ﬁrm makes an oﬀer during the ﬁrst period and the oﬀer is accepted.5 This happens when
contracting under uncertainty yields a higher expected payoﬀ, for both the ﬁrm and the worker,
than the expected matching in the second period.
The ﬁrst part of the paper investigates unravelling when the mechanism in the second period is
assumed to produce the ex-post stable matching. In the environment considered here there always
exists a unique ex-post stable matching. It is obtained by matching the best ﬁrm with its most-
preferred worker, next-best ﬁrm with its most-preferred worker from among the remaining ones etc.
The focus of this part of the paper is to analyze how the nature of equilibria changes with similarity
of ﬁrms’ preferences, under the ex-post stable mechanism. In particular, sequential equilibria in
pure strategies are explored. It is shown that the nature of these equilibria depends crucially on
the level of similarity: unravelling occurs only in markets where ﬁrms’ preferences are suﬃciently
similar. And more ﬁrms contract early in equilibrium as preferences become more similar.
With very similar preferences, many ﬁrms are likely to prefer the same workers. Once the infor-
mation about rankings arrives and the ex-post stable matching is implemented by the mechanism,
the best ﬁrms are matched with workers preferred by most ﬁrms, and worse ﬁrms are very likely
to be matched with workers they rank low. Even before ﬁrms know the actual rankings, they are
aware that once that information is available, all ﬁrms will compete for the same workers. Amid
such competition, worse ﬁrms may have a better chance to hire their top candidates if they contract
before rankings are known. Contracting so early presents some risk: the ﬁrm may end up with an
even worse candidate. But there is also a chance that the worker hired in the ﬁrst period will turn
out to be one of the ﬁrm’s top candidates. If the ﬁrm waits for the second period, its most desired
candidates will be most likely hired by better ﬁrms, so such risk may be worth taking.
By contrast, in any market characterized by independent preferences, unravelling does not occur.
Under independent preferences ﬁrms are likely to prefer diﬀerent candidates. The threat to the worse
ﬁrms that they will end up with their less preferred workers if they wait is not large enough to make
taking the risk of early contracting worthwhile. As similarity of preferences increases, equilibria
involving unravelling are more likely to occur, and it becomes less likely that “no unravelling” is an
equilibrium.
The second part of the paper studies the problem of mechanism design in markets where un-
ravelling is possible. Before the game starts, a mechanism is chosen for the second period. The
mechanism is announced at the outset of the game, so that ﬁrms and workers are aware of it during
the ﬁrst period. The goal is to provide a Pareto-optimal outcome from the ex-ante perspective of
the beginning of period 1.
It turns out that any Pareto-optimal mechanism must preclude unravelling. Whenever a mech-
anism induces early contracting, it is always possible to ﬁnd another mechanism that precludes
5All oﬀers made in the ﬁrst period expire by the end of that period. Such oﬀers are sometimes referred to as
“exploding oﬀers”. Niederle and Roth (2004) show that exploding oﬀers are necessary for unravelling to occur.
3unravelling and Pareto-improves the outcome. This new mechanism mimics everyone’s expected
payoﬀs, except for the ﬁrms that were unravelling under the original mechanism. These ﬁrms’
payoﬀs are strictly improved by the new mechanism. This is possible because in unravelling the
ﬁrms could match with their least preferred workers. The new mechanism can assure that this does
not happen. By the assumption that there are more workers than ﬁrms, it is always possible to
ﬁnd an allocation at which no ﬁrm is matched with its lowest-ranked worker. Thus, precluding
unravelling is a necessary condition for a mechanism to be Pareto-optimal. The ﬁrst part of the
paper shows that the ex-post stable mechanism may unravel. When this is the case, this mechanism
cannot be Pareto-optimal. However, whenever the ex-post stable mechanism does not unravel, it
is Pareto-optimal. In the special case of the ex-post stable mechanism, precluding unravelling is
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for Pareto-optimality. Furthermore, it is shown that in every
market there exists a mechanism producing a Pareto-optimal outcome. In some markets, however,
all Pareto-optimal mechanisms are ex-post unstable.
The model in this paper helps to explain why unravelling happens in some markets and not
others. It shows that unravelling will occur only in markets characterized by substantial similarity
of preferences. Indeed, it may be argued that employers have more similar preferences in markets
where unravelling has been reported than in markets that do not seem to unravel. For instance,
medical and law students (i.e., markets where unravelling is most prominent) are evaluated mainly
on their grades, which are interpreted similarly by all potential employers. In such a case, employers’
preferences are apt to be very similar. In disciplines like ﬁnance, economics, and biology, by contrast,
students are assessed on the basis of their job-market papers, which leave more room for subjective
evaluation. This subjectivity may contribute to diﬀerences in potential employers’ rankings of
candidates.
The model has the potential to explain unravelling in other situations, like the arranged-marriage
market. In the past, marriages were sometimes arranged when the parties were still children.6
Nowadays marriage decisions are made later in life, with more information in hand. This change
is undoubtedly driven by many factors, but it may be argued that more diﬀerentiated preferences
over potential partners is one of them. In the past, the attractiveness of a potential spouse was
primarily a matter of his of her wealth and social status, both of which were easy to observe and
valued similarly by all interested parties. Over time, characteristics other than wealth have become
relatively more important, and diﬀerences in the ways that people gauge attractiveness have con-
sequently grown. It follows from the model that early marriages (unravelling) become less likely
when preferences are more diﬀerenciated.
Section 2 of this paper contains an illustrative example, before the model is formally presented
in Section 3. Section 4 investigates unravelling under an ex-post stable mechanism. Subsection 4.1
focuses on equilibria without unravelling, while subsection 4.2 explores the existence and character-
istics of equilibria with unravelling. Section 5 analyzes the problem of mechanism design in markets
where unravelling is possible. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding observations.
2 Example
Before setting up the general model, this section presents a simple example illustrating the impor-
tance of similarity of preferences.
6Such early arranged marriages are considered in the literature to be instances of unravelling (e.g. Roth and
Xing, 1994).
4In a market, there are 3 ﬁrms named f1, f2 and f3, and 4 workers: w1, w2, w3 and w4. All
workers have the same preferences over the ﬁrms. Being hired by the most preferred ﬁrm, ﬁrm 3,
yields utility of 6. Being hired by ﬁrm 2 yields 5. And the worst ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1, yields 4. Remaining
unmatched is worth 0.
Firms have diﬀerent preferences over the workers. For instance, ﬁrm 3 may ﬁnd worker w1
to be most desirable, followed by w2, w3 and w4, when ﬁrm 1 would like to hire w2 the most, w4
somewhat less, w1 even less, and w3 the least. Firms’ preferences are represented by rankings — lists
ordering workers from the least-preferred (lowest-ranked) to the most-preferred (highest-ranked).
The preferences described above can be represented by ﬁrm 3’s ranking (w4,w3,w2,w1), and ﬁrm 1’s
ranking (w3,w1,w4,w2). This example will consider diﬀerent cases for ﬁrms’ preferences. In all cases,
not hiring anyone at all is the worst outcome, yielding 0. When the ﬁrm hires its lowest-ranked
worker, it receives a payoﬀ of 1. The next worker on the list yields 2. The 3rd worker on the ﬁrm’s
ranking list yields 3, and the highest-ranked worker yields 4.
There are two periods. Workers’ preferences are commonly known from the beginning of the ﬁrst
period. Firms’ preferences, however, are private information that the ﬁrms themselves learn only
in the beginning of the second period. From the ﬁrst period perspective, every possible ranking is
equally likely. To illustrate the importance of similarity of ﬁrms’ preferences, this example considers
two cases: in the ﬁrst one, all ﬁrms’ rankings are identical — one ranking for all ﬁrms is drawn
from among all possible rankings. In the second case, each ﬁrm’s ranking is drawn independently.
Firms and workers can contract in the ﬁrst period, even though the ﬁrms’ preferences are not
yet known at that time. If a ﬁrm and a worker contract in the ﬁrst period, they leave the market. In
the second period the ex-post stable mechanism operates over all ﬁrms and workers that are still in
the market. This mechanism produces the ex-post stable matching over the remaining agents. With
workers’ preferences being identical, there is always a unique ex-post stable matching obtained in a
following way: the best ﬁrm in the market is matched with its highest-ranked worker from among
the available ones, then the next-best ﬁrm is matched with its highest-ranked worker from the
remaining ones and so on.
Firms’ preferences are identical. Consider what happens when all ﬁrms wait for the ex-post
stable matching. When ﬁrms’ preferences are identical, the best ﬁrm, ﬁrm 3, will get its (and every
other ﬁrm’s) most-preferred worker, and receive payoﬀ of 4. Firm 2 will be matched with the 3rd
worker in the ranking (i.e., almost the most-preferred worker) and receive payoﬀ of 3. By then the
4th and the 3rd workers in ﬁrm 1’s ranking (the highest-ranked workers) will not be available, so it
will be matched with the 2nd worker in its ranking. Firm 1 receives payoﬀ of 2. These payoﬀs can
be established already in the ﬁrst period, before the common ranking is realized and it is known
which worker is the most-preferred one etc.
From the ﬁrst period perspective, every worker is equally likely to be in any place in a ﬁrm’s
ranking. Thus, a ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ from contracting in the ﬁrst period is the average value of
all the workers, i.e. 2.5. For ﬁrm 1 this payoﬀ is greater than what the ﬁrm will get by waiting for
the ex-post stable mechanism (2.5 > 2). Thus, ﬁrm 1 has incentive to contract early (but notice
that ﬁrm 2 does not). Firm 1 would also be accepted in the ﬁrst period. Because every ranking is
equally likely, all workers have the same chance to be matched to any ﬁrm in the second period (or
remain unmatched): any worker will be matched with ﬁrm 3, ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 1 or remain unmatched,
each with probability 1
4. Thus a worker’s expected value of waiting until the second period is 15
4 .
Accepting ﬁrm 1 in the ﬁrst period yields 4, which is better. Thus, there will be unravelling, as
ﬁrm 1 wants to contract in the ﬁrst period and is accepted.
Firms’ preferences are independent. Firms’ preferences are independent when each ranking
is drawn from the uniform distribution independently of the others. Now the probability that ﬁrm 3’s
5most-preferred worker is the same as ﬁrm 2’s most-preferred worker is 1
4. If all ﬁrms wait for the
mechanism in the second period, the ex-post stable matching always assigns ﬁrm 3 to its most-
preferred worker, yielding payoﬀ of 4. Firm 2 is matched with its highest-ranked worker available
after ﬁrm 3 is matched. With probability 1
4 ﬁrm 2’s most-preferred worker was assigned to ﬁrm 3,
and ﬁrm 2 is matched with the 3rd worker in its ranking, receiving payoﬀ of 3. Otherwise, it is
matched with its most-preferred worker and receives 4. Thus, ﬁrm 2’s expected payoﬀ is 15
4 . The
worst ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1, is then matched with its highest-ranked worker among the remaining ones. With
probability 1
4 · 1
3 · 2 = 1
6 two highest-ranked workers of ﬁrm 1 (workers 4th and 3rd in the ranking)
have been assigned to better ﬁrms, and ﬁrm 1 is matched with the 2nd worker in its ranking,
receiving payoﬀ of 2. With probability 1
4 · (1 − 1
3) · 2 = 1
3 the most-preferred worker of ﬁrm 1 was
assigned to either of the better ﬁrms, but not the 3rd worker. So ﬁrm 1 is matched with the 3rd
worker, and receives 3. With the remaining probability of 1
2 neither of the better ﬁrms was assigned
to ﬁrm 1’s most-preferred worker, and ﬁrm 1 receives payoﬀ of 4. Altogether, waiting for the ex-post
stable mechanism yields ﬁrm 1 expected payoﬀ of 1
6 · 2 + 1
3 · 3 + 1
2 · 4 = 3.333. Under independent
preferences, ﬁrm 1 does not have incentive to contract early, as 3.333 > 2.5. Thus, unravelling will
not occur when ﬁrms’ preferences are independent.
3 The Model
To investigate unravelling, I construct a two-stage game between two types of agents: ﬁrms and
workers. Firms and workers can contract during the ﬁrst stage. If they do, they leave the market.
In the second stage, the remaining agents are matched by a mechanism. The game — described in
this section — is represented in Figure 1.
The market is populated by F ﬁrms, f ∈ {1,...,F}, and W workers, w ∈ {1,...,W}. There
are more workers than ﬁrms, W > F.7 Each ﬁrm has exactly one position to ﬁll, and each worker
can take at most one job.
Let F ⊆ {1,...,F} denote an arbitrary subset of ﬁrms. Similarly, let W ⊆ {1,...,W} denote
an arbitrary subset of workers.
Workers have identical preferences over ﬁrms: all workers consider ﬁrm F the most desirable,
ﬁrm F−1 — the second-best, and so on. The utility for a worker from being matched to ﬁrm f is
uf, and the utility from being unmatched is 0. Workers prefer being hired by the worst ﬁrm to not
being hired at all, i.e., 0 < u1 < u2 < ... < uF. Let u ≡ [u1, u2,..., uF].










which is an ordered list of length W, where r
f
1 represents the lowest-ranked (least-desired) worker,
and r
f
W represents the highest-ranked (most-desired) worker in ﬁrm f’s ranking. Every worker has
exactly one position in every ﬁrm’s ranking. Let R = [R1, ..., RF] be the vector of all ﬁrms’
rankings. For a subset of ﬁrms F, let RF be the corresponding vector of the rankings of the ﬁrms
in F.
The value to ﬁrm f of being matched to worker r
f
k is vk.8 It is better to hire the worst worker
than to keep a vacancy, i.e., 0 < v1 < v2 < ... < vW. Let v ≡ [v1, v2, ..., vW]. The matching value
7Because the model assumes that it is always better to be matched with a worker than to keep a vacancy, with
W < F independent preferences would not be possible.
8The assumption that every ﬁrm has the same value of being matched with k-th worker on its list is needed for
clarity of exposition. The general results remain true for diﬀering matching values (see footnote 19).
6vectors, u and v, are publicly known.9 There are no transfers between ﬁrms and workers. When
ﬁrm f is matched with worker r
f
k, the worker receives utility of exactly uf and the ﬁrm receives a
payoﬀ of exactly vk.
Deﬁnition 1. A matching between F and W is a function µF,W : F → W∪{∅} that assigns every








Expression µF,W(f) = ∅ means that in matching µF,W, ﬁrm f is not matched with any worker.
When µF,W(f) = w ∈ W, then ﬁrm f is matched with worker w. In general, any worker w ∈ W
is matched in µF,W if and only if there exists a ﬁrm f ∈ F such that µF,W(f) = w. Otherwise, a
worker is unmatched in µF,W.
Much of the literature emphasizes the importance of ex-post stability in matching. Roth (1991)
and Kagel and Roth (2000), for example, argue that ex-post stable matching implemented after the
arrival of relevant information should preclude early contracting. The notion of ex-post stability10
was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). A matching is called ex-post unstable if it results in a
ﬁrm and a worker who would prefer to be matched to each other than to remain in their current
matches. A matching is called ex-post stable if it is not ex-post unstable.
For any F and W, let µ(F,W) denote the set of all possible matchings between F and W.
Which of them is ex-post stable depends on ﬁrms’ preferences, RF. A well established result in
the literature (e.g., Gusﬁeld and Irving (1989) or Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) states that in the
environment where workers’ preferences are identical, for any given ﬁrms’ preference proﬁle there
exists a unique ex-post stable matching between F and W.11 It can be characterized in the following
way: The best ﬁrm — the ﬁrm most desired by workers — in F is matched with its highest-ranked
worker in W. Then, the next-best ﬁrm is matched with its highest-ranked worker from among the
remaining workers, and so on. Every ﬁrm in F is matched to its highest-ranked worker remaining
in the pool after all the better ﬁrms in F have been matched. Let µ
F,W
S (RF) denote the ex-post
stable matching between F and W under ﬁrms’ rankings RF. For any f ∈ F, let µ
F,W
S (f|RF) refer
to the worker matched with f in such matching.
A matching is deﬁned between a subset of ﬁrms and a subset of workers. The special case of
a matching between all ﬁrms and all workers describes an outcome in the market. A matching
outcome refers to a matching between all ﬁrms, {1,...,F}, and all workers, {1,...,W}, realized
at the end of the two-stage game. The ex-post stable outcome — denoted by oS — is the ex-
post stable matching between all workers, {1,...,W}, and all ﬁrms, {1,...,F}, in the market:
oS ≡ µ
{1,...,W},{1,...,F}
S . I drop R from the notation, keeping in mind that ex-post stable matching
depends on rankings. In the ex-post stable outcome, oS, ﬁrm F is matched with its most-preferred
worker, rF
W. Firm (F − 1) is then matched with its most-preferred worker excluding w ≡ rF
W, who
has been already matched with ﬁrm F, etc. That is, any ﬁrm f is matched with its most-preferred
worker remaining in the pool after all ﬁrms better than f have been matched. Since the ex-post
stable outcome is unique for every market, any other matching outcome is ex-post unstable. In
9For the purposes of this analysis, vk and uf do not need to be the precise values of a match; it is suﬃcient if
they are the expected values. The actual values may be realized only after the match is made.
10Gale and Shapley (1962) call this property “stability.” Here it is called “ex-post stability” to emphasize the fact
that a matching satisfying this property may nevertheless unravel, and thus in a sense may be “ex-ante” unstable
though it is “ex-post” stable.
11With arbitrary workers’ preferences, ex-post stable matching does not need to be unique (Gale and Shapley
1962).
7particular in the case where there is ex-post stable matching between subsets F and W, but the
rest of ﬁrms and workers are matched in some other way (e.g. at random), the matching outcome
in the market is not ex-post stable.
In some situations ﬁrms are asked to report their rankings and a matching is produced based on
those reports. In these situations the matching is produced by a matching mechanism, also called
a clearinghouse.
Deﬁnition 2. A matching mechanism, M, is a function that maps F, W, and ﬁrms’ reported
rankings, b RF, to a lottery over all matchings between F and W. That is









is an element of the set of all possible lotteries on µ(F,W).
A matching mechanism is incentive compatible if no ﬁrm beneﬁts from misreporting its pref-
erences. A mechanism is called ex-post stable — and denoted MS — if it applies ex-post stable
matching to the reported rankings with probability 1. It is easy to conﬁrm that in this model
the ex-post stable mechanism is incentive compatible. Therefore, the ex-post stable mechanism
operating over F and W will produce ex-post stable matching between F and W.12
There are two periods in the model: t = 1,2. Workers’ preferences are commonly known in
both periods. Firms learn their own preferences, in the form of rankings, only at the beginning of
period 2. Each ﬁrm’s ranking is its private information.
With W workers there are W! possible rankings. Denote as R the set of all possible rankings
over workers. The rankings for all F ﬁrms, (R1,...,RF), are drawn from a joint distribution G over
RF. The model focuses on distributions where the marginal distributions of individual rankings are
always uniform, allowing for diﬀerent levels of similarity between the rankings.13 Two special cases
— of identical preferences and independent preferences — are deﬁned below.
Let G1 be the joint distribution where all ﬁrms’ rankings are identical and the marginal distri-
bution of any individual ranking is uniform on R. That is, every ranking in R is drawn with equal
probability of 1
W! and all ﬁrms will have the same ranking.
Let G0 be the joint distribution such that any ﬁrm’s ranking is drawn from the uniform distri-
bution independently of any other ﬁrms’ rankings. That is, any combination of ﬁrms’ rankings is





Between the identical and the independent rankings, there is a continuum of cases of intermediate
similarity, Gρ.
Deﬁnition 3. For ρ ∈ [0,1],
Gρ = ρG1 + (1 − ρ)G0
12Incentive compatibility means that there exists an equilibrium where all ﬁrms report their true preferences. In





relevant in producing ex-post stable matching. Under the ex-post stable mechanism, misreporting this portion of its
ranking would make the ﬁrm strictly worse. Misreporting the rest of the ranking is irrelevant for the equilibrium
outcome. Therefore, under the ex-post stable mechanism, the unique equilibrium outcome is ex-post stable matching
between the agents that participate in the mechanism.
13The uniform prior is convenient for the presentation of the results. However, similar arguments can be made
with other priors.
8The parameter ρ is a measure of preference similarity14 and will be a comparative statics pa-
rameter in the analysis below. Preferences are said to be more similar under Gρ0 than under Gρ
when ρ0 > ρ. Since ρ completely characterizes Gρ, the two are used interchangeably.
The marginal distributions are uniform under both G1 and G0, and also under Gρ. Therefore,
prior beliefs in period 1 about ﬁrms’ preferences are also uniform, for both workers and ﬁrms. That
is, any worker may turn out to be the k-th worker (k = 1,...,W) in a given ﬁrm’s ranking with
equal probability.
A market in this model is characterized by the number of ﬁrms F, the number of workers W,
matching value vectors u and v, similarity of preferences, ρ and the mechanism applied in the
second period M. Thus, a market is fully described by a tuple (F,W,u,v,ρ,M).
Figure 1 illustrates how the game unfolds. Market characteristics (F,W,u,v,ρ,M) and workers’
preferences are commonly known at any time. At the beginning of period 1, ﬁrms simultaneously
decide whether or not to make an early oﬀer, and if so, to which worker. Each ﬁrm can make at
most one oﬀer. After the early oﬀers are released, each worker observes the oﬀers he has received, if
any. He does not see oﬀers made to other workers. Every worker presented with an oﬀer accepts or
rejects it, based on his beliefs about other agents’ strategies. He may accept at most one oﬀer. If an
oﬀer is accepted, the matched ﬁrm and worker leave the market. Firms whose oﬀers were rejected
or who did not make an oﬀer in period 1, remain in the market for period 2. In period 2, ﬁrms’
rankings are realized and a matching mechanism M operates on the agents remaining in the market.
Section 4 of the paper assumes the ex-post stable mechanism in period 2. Section 5 considers other
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Figure 1: Timeline of the game
This paper considers only incentive compatible mechanisms.15 Under an incentive compatible
mechanism, ﬁrms truthfully report their rankings in period 2. Therefore, both ﬁrms and workers
make their strategic decisions only in period 1. First, every ﬁrm decides whether or not to make
14Similarity of preferences, as measured by ρ is similar to the concept of correlation. However, correlation for
rankings is not well deﬁned. Since preferences are expressed as rankings, rankings and preferences are used inter-
changeably.
15Since the revelation principle holds in this environment, this is without loss of generality.
9an oﬀer and if so, to which worker. The analysis focuses on sequential equilibria in pure strategies,
where the strategy of any ﬁrm f is σf ∈ {1,...,W} ∪ {∅}. Since a worker can accept or reject
an oﬀer only if he has received it, a worker’s strategy depends on the oﬀers he has received. Let
Ωw ⊂ {1,...,F} be the set of ﬁrms that have made an oﬀer to worker w in period 1. Then, the
worker’s strategy, σw(Ωw) ∈ Ωw∪{∅}, is the oﬀer that he accepts. Strategy σw(Ωw) = ∅ means that
the worker rejects all oﬀers. Let vector σ be the strategy proﬁle for all ﬁrms and workers.
Firms move ﬁrst and simultaneously, so there is only one information set for each ﬁrm. When
worker w makes a decision, his information set is characterized by the set of oﬀers he has received,
Ωw.
Every ﬁrm’s payoﬀ depends on many variables: market characteristics (F,W,u,v,ρ,M), ﬁrms’
realized rankings R, and the strategies played by all agents in the market. The payoﬀ expected
by ﬁrm f at the beginning of the game depends on market characteristics, f’s strategy and its
beliefs about other agents’ strategies. Similarly, any worker’s utility and expected utility depend on
the corresponding variables. For clarity, most of this notation is suppressed and only the variables
essential to the current analysis are retained.




— its expected payoﬀ from playing




– his expected utility
from playing strategy σw.
A deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium applied to this model yields following characterization of
equilibrium.
In the game with market (F,W,u,v,ρ,M), a proﬁle of strategies and system of beliefs constitute
a sequential equilibrium when
(1) strategies are sequentially rational given the beliefs, i.e.
(f) in its only information set, ﬁrm f ∈ {1,...,F} chooses σ∗












∀σf ∈ {1,...,W} ∪ {∅}
(w) in each information set Ωw, each worker w ∈ {1,...,W} chooses his strategy, condi-
tionally on the set of received oﬀers, σ∗












∀σw ∈ {Ωw} ∪ {∅}
(2) beliefs are consistent with the strategies played.
The beliefs are consistent with the strategies played on the equilibrium path. Firms make
their decisions simultaneously at the beginning of the game. They cannot observe anything oﬀ the
equilibrium path. Workers observe only the set of their own oﬀers when making a decision to accept
or reject. There are only two possible events that a worker may observe oﬀ-the-equilibrium path:
when he receives an oﬀer he did not expect, and when he does not receive an oﬀer he expected.
A property of sequential equilibrium determines in a unique way, sequentially rational beliefs and
strategies even at the decision nodes not reached on the equilibrium path. In particular, in a
sequential equilibrium, when a worker receives an oﬀer he did not expect, he updates his beliefs
only about the ﬁrm that made him the oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀer. Now he believes that the ﬁrm made
him an oﬀer, instead of making it to some other worker or making no oﬀer at all. However, this
oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀer does not change the worker’s beliefs about any other ﬁrm.
In the case that a worker did not receive an oﬀer he expected, he now beliefs that the ﬁrm has
taken the best strategy available after excluding this worker. Again, this oﬀ-the-equilibrium event
does not change the worker’s beliefs about other ﬁrms.
10Oﬀers made and accepted in period 1 constitute unravelling.
Deﬁnition 4 (unravelling). Unravelling is a situation where in equilibrium some ﬁrms and workers
contract in the ﬁrst period, before ﬁrms know their own preferences.
4 Unravelling under Ex-Post Stable Mechanism
Ex-post stable matching is considered desirable in the extant literature. It has been proposed that
an ex-post stable mechanism prevents unravelling (Roth 1991, Kagel and Roth 2000). It has also
been argued that the ex-post stable outcome maximizes social welfare (Bulow and Levin 2006).
Moreover, the ex-post stable mechanism is often adopted by clearinghouses introduced to prevent
unravelling. The mechanism is chosen for clearinghouses either independently, as in the market for
medical residents in 1952, or on the recommendation of economists, as in the case of the Boston
public schools in 2005.16 It can also be argued that ex-post stable matching is one of the equilibria
in a decentralized market (a market without a clearinghouse) after information about preferences
becomes available.
Given that the literature focuses on ex-post stable mechanisms, this section investigates unrav-
elling under the ex-post stable matching mechanism. Subsection 4.1 focuses on equilibria without
unravelling, while Subsection 4.2 describes equilibria when unravelling occurs.
This section assumes that the mechanism applied to the reported rankings in period 2 is the ex-
post stable mechanism, MS. Mechanism MS is not only incentive compatible, but in all equilibria
it also produces ex-post stable matching among the agents remaining in period 2. Unless unravelling
occurs in period 1, it produces the ex-post stable outcome, oS.
For both ﬁrms and workers, the decision whether to contract early presents a trade-oﬀ. A worker
who receives an oﬀer from ﬁrm f in period 1 chooses between uf — a sure payoﬀ for accepting the
oﬀer — and a lottery in period 2, in which he might be matched to a better ﬁrm or a worse ﬁrm or
even remain unmatched. For a ﬁrm, early contracting yields expected payoﬀ of the average value
of workers, due to the uniform prior. The alternative is the ex-post stable matching in period 2,
where better ﬁrms may be matched with ﬁrm f’s most preferred workers.
When a ﬁrm expects the ex-post stable outcome in period 2, its expected payoﬀ depends on its
own position and the level of similarity of preferences in the market. The ex-post stable outcome
has two properties that are of particular interest here. One is that lower-ranked ﬁrms receive lower
expected payoﬀs in ex-post stable matching, and the other is that ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀs decrease
as preferences become more similar.
In a given market, a lower-ranked ﬁrm expects a lower expected payoﬀ from the ex-post stable
outcome than a higher-ranked ﬁrm expects. In period 2, ﬁrm f gets its most-preferred worker that
remains in the pool after all better ﬁrms i > f have been matched. Because fewer workers are left
for worse ﬁrms, it is more likely that such ﬁrms’ most-preferred workers are already matched. For
this reason, worse ﬁrms are more likely to prefer early contracting under MS than better ﬁrms.
To unravel, therefore, ﬁrms need to be good enough to be accepted in period 1 and bad enough
to want to contract early. The result is “unravelling in the middle” — the phenomenon that in a
typical market it is not the best or worst ﬁrms but ﬁrms “in the middle” that unravel. In special
cases, ﬁrms at the extremes of the spectrum also contract early. It is possible to ﬁnd equilibria in
which any ﬁrm (except the best one) unravels.
16See Kimberly Atkins, “Committee OKs new school assignment plan”, Boston Herald, July 21, 2005.
11Moreover, ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀs decrease as preferences become more similar. The best ﬁrm,
F, is always matched with its most-preferred worker, but for all other ﬁrms the expected value
of oS strictly decreases as ρ increases. Greater similarity of preferences increases the probability
that other ﬁrms will prefer the same workers that ﬁrm f does. Better ﬁrms are more likely to be
matched with ﬁrm f’s most-preferred workers in the ex-post stable outcome, and ﬁrm f will thus
be matched with its lower-ranked workers with higher probability. Because of this property, more
ﬁrms prefer to contract early as preference similarity increases.
Let Eπf(oS|ρ) denote ﬁrm f’s expected payoﬀ in the ex-post stable outcome in a given market.
Then the following lemma summarizes the properties of oS.
Lemma 1 (properties of oS). .
(1) In any market (F,W,u,v,ρ,MS), for any f > 1, Eπf−1(oS |ρ) < Eπf(oS |ρ).
(2) Holding other market parameters constant, for any f < F,
ρ < ρ
0 =⇒ Eπf(oS |ρ) > Eπf(oS |ρ
0)
Proof. See the Appendix, page 28.
4.1 Equilibria without Unravelling
An equilibrium has no unravelling when either no ﬁrm makes an early oﬀer, or all early oﬀers are
rejected. This subsection explores conditions under which such an equilibrium exists.
Without unravelling, the ex-post stable mechanism MS produces the ex-post stable outcome,
oS. Contracting in period 1 is contracting under uncertainty, in that ﬁrms’ preferences are not
known yet. A proﬁtable deviation exists only when both the ﬁrm and the worker are better oﬀ
contracting with deﬁcient information than waiting for the uncertainty to be resolved.
Consider a worker who receives an oﬀer from ﬁrm f in period 1, when in equilibrium all ﬁrms
are expected to participate in the period 2 mechanism. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, he receives
utility uf. If he rejects the oﬀer, all ﬁrms and all workers participate in the period 2 matching
mechanism. All the workers are a priori identical, and they have an equal chance of 1
W of being











Obviously, ﬁrm F is always accepted. Whether other ﬁrms are accepted depends on the value
parameters u and the number of workers, W.
For any given market, the right-hand side of inequality (1) is constant, and uf’s are ordered to
be increasing in f. Therefore, there is a cut-oﬀ point: the lowest-ranked ﬁrm whose oﬀer will be
accepted in period 1, as a deviation from the ex-post stable outcome. Let L0














12All ﬁrms worse than L0 will be rejected in period 1. Firm L0 and all ﬁrms better than L0 will be
accepted. The set of ﬁrms that will be accepted in period 1 is the acceptance set:
n
L0
(W,u) , ..., F
o
Notice that at the end of period 2 there are always W − F > 0 workers who are unemployed,
and who receive payoﬀ 0. Because of the threat of unemployment, for any W and any f there exists
a u such that the acceptance set includes f, i.e., L0
(W,u) ≤ f. In particular, it is possible that all
ﬁrms would be accepted in period 1; that is, there exist W and u such that L0
(W,u) = 1. This will
occur when the number of workers, W, is large enough and the high probability of unemployment
makes the utility expected in period 2 lower than u1.
The incentives for ﬁrms to contract in period 1, before all relevant information is available,
depend on the joint distribution of rankings, Gρ. The realization of rankings — together with
the matching mechanism — determines the outcome realized in period 2. Firms’ expected payoﬀs
depend on this expected outcome. Recall that Eπf(oS|ρ) denotes ﬁrm f’s expected payoﬀ from the
ex-post stable outcome under Gρ.
The uniform prior implies that in period 1 all workers are ex ante the same. Thus an oﬀer made
to any worker in period 1 yields the same expected payoﬀ. Any ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ from early








Firm f prefers early contracting to ex-post stable outcome when
π
0 > Eπf(oS|ρ) (2)
Firm F never has incentives to make an oﬀer in period 1, since in the ex-post stable outcome
it always hires its most-preferred worker. Other ﬁrms may have something to gain from an early
oﬀer, depending on ρ and v.
Example 1. Consider ﬁrm F −1. In the ex-post stable outcome this ﬁrm gets its most-preferred
worker, r
F−1




ﬁrm F−1 gets the next worker on its list: r
F−1
W−1. Since the probability that r
F−1
W ≡ rF
W under Gρ is
ρ + (1 − ρ) 1
W, the expected payoﬀ from the ex-post stable matching is













In a market with 2 ﬁrms and 3 workers where v = [1,2,6], Eπ1(oS |ρ) = 14
3 (1−ρ)+2ρ and π0 = 3.
Thus, ﬁrm 1 would prefer early contracting to the ex-post stable outcome when ρ > 1
2. 
The lower-ranked the ﬁrm, the lower its expected payoﬀ in the ex-post stable outcome (Lemma 1(1)).
Thus, if ﬁrm f prefers early contracting to the ex-post stable outcome, then all ﬁrms worse than f

















17For the special cases of ρ = 0 and ρ = 1 considered below, the corresponding ﬁrm H0 is denoted by H0
(G0,v) and
H0
(G1,v). Similarly, the expected payoﬀ of the ex-post stable outcome is denoted by Eπf(oS|G0) and Eπf(oS|G1)
for those special cases.
13A deviation from oS to early contracting can occur only when the oﬀer in period 1 is made and
accepted. Therefore, a proﬁtable deviation from oS is possible only when there exists a ﬁrm that
prefers early contracting to the ex-post stable matching and when this ﬁrm’s oﬀer is accepted in
period 1. That is, when there exists a ﬁrm that belongs to both the acceptance set and the oﬀer set.










The H0, and thus the oﬀer set, depend on the similarity of preferences, ρ. The following
subsections show that under independent preferences, G0, the oﬀer set is empty: no ﬁrm wants to
contract in period 1, i.e, H0
(G0,v) < 1. Under identical preferences, G1, by contrast, there may be
ﬁrms willing to contract early, depending on v. For intermediate cases, H0
(ρ,v) increases with ρ.
Independent Preferences, G0
For independently distributed rankings, no ﬁrm prefers early contracting to the ex-post stable
outcome. That is, H0
(G0,v) < 1 for any vector v; thus the oﬀer set is empty. Therefore, in any
market with independent preferences, there is an equilibrium without unravelling.
Lemma 2. For any F, v and W > F, if the preferences are independent, G0, then H0
(G0,v) < 1.
That is,
∀F,v,W s.t. W > F π
0 < Eπf(oS|G0) ∀f
Proof. See the Appendix, page 28.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider the worst ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1. All other ﬁrms are
matched before ﬁrm 1 in the ex-post stable outcome. If the number of workers were the same as
the number of ﬁrms, W = F, there would be exactly one worker left for ﬁrm 1 to match with.
Since the preferences are independent, this remaining worker may occupy any position in ﬁrm 1’s
ranking with equal probability. In such a case, the ex-post stable outcome and early contracting
would yield exactly the same expected payoﬀ for ﬁrm 1, and the ﬁrm would be indiﬀerent. However,
since W > F, the worst ﬁrm prefers the ex-post stable outcome to early contracting. This is the
case because with more than one worker to choose from, ﬁrm 1 will never be matched with its
least-preferred worker, and has higher chances (than 1
W) to be matched with any better worker.
Moreover, by the property of the ex-post stable outcome that better ﬁrms have higher expected
payoﬀ (Lemma 1(1)), any other ﬁrm also prefers the ex-post stable outcome to early contracting.
Identical Preferences, G1
Under identical preferences, the k-th worker in ﬁrm f’s ranking is also any other ﬁrm’s k-th worker.
In the ex-post stable outcome, ﬁrm F gets the best worker, rF
W, ﬁrm F −1 always gets the next
best worker, r
F−1










14Firm f prefers to contract early rather than wait for the ex-post stable outcome if the average value
of workers is larger than vW−F+f. This may be true for some ﬁrms and some values of v. With a
nonempty oﬀer set, it is always possible to ﬁnd an acceptance set for which there exists proﬁtable
deviation from oS.
Example 2 — which is a formalized part of the example in Section 2 — shows a market charac-
terized by identical preferences of ﬁrms, where there exists a proﬁtable deviation.
Example 2. Consider a market with 3 ﬁrms and 4 workers and with matching values vectors
v = [1, 2, 3, 4] and u = [4, 5, 6], and with identical ﬁrms’ preferences, G1.
The ex-post stable outcome is
oS(f3) = r
3
4 =⇒ π3(oS) = 4
oS(f2) = r
2
3 =⇒ π2(oS) = 3
oS(f1) = r
1
2 =⇒ π1(oS) = 2
An early oﬀer yields expected payoﬀ of 2.5. Since 2 < 2.5 < 3, ﬁrm 2 has no incentive to make
an early oﬀer, but ﬁrm 1 prefers to contract in period 1 than wait for r1
2 in period 2. That is,
H0
(G1,v) = 1.
A worker’s expected utility from period 2 matching is 1
W
PF
f=1 uf = 15
4 < 4 = u1. This means
that ﬁrm 1’s oﬀer in period 1 will be accepted by any worker. Thus, L0
(4,u) = 1 and the acceptance
set is {1,2,3}. Since the acceptance and the oﬀer sets overlap at H0
(G1,v) = L0
(4,u) = 1, there exists
a proﬁtable deviation from oS in this market. 
However, a proﬁtable deviation from oS may not exist even when ﬁrms’ preferences are identical.
When any ﬁrm that prefers to contract early would be rejected by a worker in period 2, there is no
proﬁtable deviation. Such a market is presented in Example 3.
Example 3. Consider a market similar to that in Example 2, with the only diﬀerence that u0 =
[2,3,4]. As before, H0
(G1,v) = 1, but now ﬁrm 1 does not belong to the acceptance set, as L0
(4,u0) = 2.
There is no proﬁtable deviation from oS in this market, as H0
(G1,v) < L0
(4,u), i.e., the oﬀer and the
acceptance set do not intersect. 
As these above illustrate, under identical preferences a proﬁtable deviation fromoS may but need
not exist. This can also be interpreted in terms of existence of an equilibrium without unravelling:
There are markets characterized by G1, in which there exists an equilibrium without unravelling,
but there also are markets with G1 in which any equilibrium must exhibit unravelling.
Intermediate Similarity of Firms’ Preferences
Firm F always has the same value of the ex-post stable matching: vW. For all the other ﬁrms, the ex-
pected value of oS decreases as similarity of preferences increases (Lemma 1(2)). As a consequence,
holding other parameters of the market constant, more ﬁrms prefer early contracting as similarity of
preferences increases. That is, holding other market parameters constant, H0
(ρ,v) ≤ H0
(ρ0,v) whenever
ρ < ρ0. Therefore, if for given market parameters (F,W,v,u) there exists a proﬁtable deviation
from oS under Gρ, then there also exists a proﬁtable deviation under Gρ0. For any market parame-
ters (F,W,v,u), in fact, there exists a threshold ρ∗∗ such that a proﬁtable deviation from oS exists
for any similarity higher than the threshold but not for similarity lower than the threshold.
15Lemma 3. For any market parameters (F,W,v,u), there exists ρ∗∗ ∈ (0,1] s.t.
for all ρ ≤ ρ∗∗, there exists an equilibrium without unravelling, and
for all ρ > ρ∗∗, there is no equilibrium without unravelling.
Proof. See the Appendix, page 29.
Workers’ incentives to accept an oﬀer in period 1 do not depend on similarity of preferences.
However, ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀs from ex-post stable outcome decrease as the preferences become
more similar. Consequently, unravelling becomes more tempting. For G0 there are no market pa-
rameters (F,W,v,u) for which a proﬁtable deviation fromoS exists. But as similarity of preferences,
ρ, increases, there are more parameters (F,W,v,u) for which a proﬁtable deviation exists. Thus,
the result in Lemma 3 implies that as similarity of preferences increases, proﬁtable deviation from
oS exists for a wider range of (F,W,v,u) parameters, and thus no-unravelling is not an equilibrium
for a wider range of (F,W,v,u) parameters.
When for given market parameters (F,W,v,u) the threshold is ρ∗∗ < 1, then for suﬃciently
similar preferences there is no equilibrium without unravelling. In Example 2, the threshold is
strictly below 1. However, when the threshold is ρ∗∗ = 1, there is an equilibrium without unravelling
for any preferences, as in Example 3. Yet Lemma 2 assures that for any market parameters the
threshold is strictly larger than 0. That is, for a market characterized by independent preferences,
G0, an equilibrium without unravelling always exists. This follows from the fact that under G0, the
oﬀer set is always empty.
4.2 Equilibria with Unravelling
The previous section analyzed the conditions under which there exists an equilibrium in which
all ﬁrms participate in MS without unravelling. But this is only one of the possible equilibrium
outcomes in this game. Other equilibria may involve contracting in period 1. This section analyzes
pure strategy equilibria in which some early contracting takes place.
Firms and workers that contract early exit the market before period 2. The remaining agents
participate in the ex-post stable matching mechanism. In equilibrium, worker w who receives oﬀers
Ωw in period 1 either accepts the best oﬀer in Ωw or rejects all of them, depending on which of the
two options maximizes his expected utility. It is suboptimal for a worker to accept an oﬀer from a
ﬁrm other than the best ﬁrm in Ωw. For a ﬁrm that prefers to contract in period 1, therefore, it is
suboptimal to compete with a better ﬁrm for the same worker. In equilibrium ﬁrms that want to
contract early make oﬀers to diﬀerent workers.
For any given equilibrium, deﬁne equilibrium unravelling set as the set of ﬁrms that contract
early in this equilibrium, and denote this set by U. The remaining ﬁrms, {1,...,F}rU, participate
in MS in period 2 with workers still remaining in the market. The equilibrium unravelling set
may be empty; such an equilibrium does not involve unravelling. More than one equilibrium may
result in the same unravelling set U. For example in one equilibrium a given ﬁrm makes an early
oﬀer and is rejected, and in another equilibrium the same ﬁrm does not make an early oﬀer at all.
Despite diﬀerent strategies, both equilibria yield the same outcome. All equilibria resulting in the
same unravelling set U are considered to be equivalent, and henceforth U characterizes this class of
equilibria.
It is a property of any equilibrium that the unravelling set is an interval, that is, U has no
“holes.” For the given equilibrium unravelling set U∗, let ﬁrm H∗ be the highest-ranked ﬁrm in U∗,
16and ﬁrm L∗ — the lowest-ranked in U∗. The fact that U∗ is an interval means that all ﬁrms worse
than H∗ but better than L∗ belong to U∗ as well.
To understand why this is true, suppose to the contrary that in some equilibrium L∗ and H∗
belong to U∗ but that a ﬁrm f between L∗ and H∗ is not in U∗. This must be the case either because
f prefers to wait or because it would not be accepted in period 1. But because f is lower-ranked
than H∗, it prefers to contract early (as H∗ does). And because it is better than L∗, it would be
accepted (as L∗ is). Therefore, it cannot be an equilibrium if L∗ and H∗ are in U∗ and f is not.
This result is formally stated in Lemma 4(1) below.
Thus, any nonempty U∗ can be characterized by the best ﬁrm (H∗) and the worst ﬁrm (L∗)
that contract early in such equilibrium: U∗ ≡ {L∗,...,H∗}, for L∗ ≤ H∗. And an equilibrium is
characterized by two conditions — one for workers and one for ﬁrms — that pin down the bounds
of the equilibrium unravelling set. Given H∗, the equilibrium condition for workers characterizes
L∗, i.e., the worst ﬁrm that would be accepted in period 1. That is, given that only ﬁrms H∗ and
below would want to make early oﬀers, workers are willing to accept only ﬁrms L∗ and above in
period 1. Similarly, given L∗, the equilibrium condition for ﬁrms characterizes H∗, i.e., the best





Figure 2: The structure of an equilibrium
In any market there is at least one equilibrium. Consider a market (F,W,u,v,ρ,MS) where
there exists a proﬁtable deviation from oS; that is, waiting for oS without unravelling is not an
equilibrium. That means that there is a number of ﬁrms, {L0
(W,u),...,H0
(ρ,v)} 6= ∅, that would like
to contract early and would be accepted in period 1, even if no other ﬁrm would. As those ﬁrms
unravel, the expected payoﬀ of waiting until the second period decreases for better ﬁrms. This is
the case because ﬁrms that unravel may end up hiring workers who would be matched to better
ﬁrms in the ex-post stable outcome. When this happens, better ﬁrms are matched with some worse
workers in period 2. This decrease in the expected payoﬀ may induce some better ﬁrms to opt for
early contracting, even though they initially preferred to wait for oS. As more ﬁrms unravel, the
expected payoﬀ for workers staying for the second period also decreases, inducing workers to accept
ﬁrms in period 1 that they initially would not accept. This circumstance again may increase the
number of ﬁrms that unravel. Eventually, either the process induces all the ﬁrms 1,...,F −1 to
unravel,18 or it reaches a “ﬁxed” state earlier. In both cases the market reaches an equilibrium
with a nonempty unravelling set. Thus, in every market there is at least one equilibrium. This
result is formally stated in Lemma 4(2) below. Moreover, in a typical market there is more than
one equilibrium.
A market with multiple equilibria is presented in Example 4.
Example 4. Consider a market with 5 ﬁrms and 6 workers where u = [2, 5, 6, 9, 10], v =
[2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 17] and ﬁrms’ preferences are identical, G1. In this market there are two possible
unravelling sets in pure strategy equilibria: U∗ = {3} and U0 = {2, 3, 4}.
18Firm F always prefers to wait for the ex-post stable mechanism in period 2, even if all other ﬁrms unravel.
17Firms’ condition for U∗ is as follows: Knowing that ﬁrm 3 or better would be accepted in period 1,
ﬁrm 3 prefers early contracting, but ﬁrm 4 prefers to wait for the ex-post stable matching — without
ﬁrm 3 — in period 2. Workers’ condition for U∗ speciﬁes that, knowing that ﬁrms 5 and 4 prefer
to participate in period 2 matching, a worker accepts ﬁrm 3 but not ﬁrm 2 in period 1. Matching
with ﬁrm 2 yields lower utility for a worker than the expectations for period 2, even without ﬁrm 3.
Conditions for U0 are calculated in a similar fashion. 
In Example 4 both equilibrium unravelling sets were nonempty. But this does not need to be
the case. The following example shows a market with multiple equilibria, some with unravelling
and others without.
Example 5. Consider a market similar to that in Example 4, with the sole diﬀerence that u0 =
[1, 6, 7, 14, 15]. In such a market there are also exactly 2 equilibrium unravelling sets. One is the
same as before, U0 = {2,3,4}, but the other is U∗ = ∅.
That U∗ = ∅ is an equilibrium unravelling set is veriﬁed by showing that H0
(G1,v) < L0
(6,u0). Since





(6,u0) = 4 and the acceptance set in
this market is {4, 5}. As the expected payoﬀ of an early oﬀer is 1
6
P
vk = 6.5, so H0
(G1,v) = 3 and
the oﬀer set is {1, 2, 3}. Therefore, the oﬀer and the acceptance sets do not intersect, i.e., there
exists an equilibrium where U∗ = ∅ is the equilibrium unravelling set. 
However, equilibrium unravelling sets cannot be arbitrary. For any two equilibrium unravelling
sets in a given market, one needs to be fully included in the other. In particular, two equilibrium
unravelling sets for the same market cannot “overlap.” To understand why, suppose to the contrary
that there exist two equilibrium unravelling sets U∗ and U0 as in Figure 3(a). Notice that U∗ includes
better ﬁrms (on average) than U0, and so worse ﬁrms (on average) stay for the period 2 under U∗
than under U0. By the equilibrium condition for workers, ﬁrm f is not included in U∗ because its
early oﬀer would not be accepted. But since better ﬁrms unravel under U∗ than under U0, the
expected utility for workers of staying in the market for t = 2 is lower under U∗ than under U0. If
under U0 it was better for a worker to accept ﬁrm f in period 1 than to wait for the expected utility











(b) A possible conﬁguration of multiple equilibrium unravelling sets
Figure 3: Multiple equilibria with unravelling
The following lemma summarizes properties of equilibria in an arbitrary market with the ex-post
stable matching mechanism, (F,W,u,v,ρ,MS).
18Lemma 4. Given a market (F,W,u,v,ρ,MS):
(1) (interval property) In any equilibrium, the equilibrium unravelling set, U, is an interval.
(2) (existence of pure strategy equilibrium) There exists an equilibrium in pure strategies.
(3) (multiple equilibria) If there are two equilibrium unravelling sets, U∗ and U0 where U∗ 6= U0,
then either U∗ ⊂ U0 or U0 ⊂ U∗. Moreover, if both unravelling sets are nonempty, U∗ =






Proof. See the Appendix, page 29.
The last property of multiple equilibria leads to conclusions about how increasing similarity of
preferences drives changes in equilibrium outcomes.
Comparative statics on ρ
This subsection investigates how equilibrium unravelling sets in a market (F,W,u,v,ρ,MS) change
with the level of similarity of preferences, ρ, when other market parameters are held constant. It is
shown that, in general, equilibrium unravelling — as measured by the size of U — weakly increases
with the similarity of preferences.
If a market is characterized by independent preferences, all equilibria result in no unravelling. By
Lemma 2, there always exists an equilibrium without unravelling for G0. The following observation
also says that no other equilibrium outcome is possible.
Observation. In any market with G0, the unique equilibrium outcome is “no-unravelling.”
Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium with a nonempty unravelling set U 6= ∅.
Then, for any ﬁrm f in U, early contracting must yield a higher payoﬀ than waiting for period 2.
Let η denote the number of ﬁrms better than f that unravel. Under independent preferences it makes
no diﬀerence for ﬁrm f in period 2 if another ﬁrm contracts early with a random worker or picks its
most-preferred worker before f in the ex-post stable matching. When η ﬁrms worse than f contract
early, the eﬀect on f’s expected payoﬀ is the same as if η more ﬁrms were choosing their most-
preferred worker before f in the ex-post stable matching. Therefore, ﬁrm f’s payoﬀ from waiting
when η worse ﬁrms unravel is the same as the payoﬀ for ﬁrm f−η in oS (without unravelling). But
Lemma 2 says that in oS even ﬁrm f−η gets a higher payoﬀ than π0. This leads to a contradiction.
Thus, under independent preferences the unique equilibrium outcome is “no unravelling.”
In a given market characterized by arbitrary preferences, U = ∅ is an equilibrium unravelling
set if and only if there is no proﬁtable deviation from oS in this market. Therefore, Lemma 3
implies that as ρ increases, equilibria with U = ∅ exist for a smaller range of market parameters
(F,W,u,v).
By the property of multiple equilibrium unravelling sets (Lemma 4(3)), every equilibrium unrav-
elling set in a given market (if there is more than one) has a diﬀerent number of ﬁrms contracting
early. Thus, for any market, all equilibria can be ordered by the size of U. The maximum equilib-
rium (UMAX) and the minimum equilibrium (UMIN) can be distinguished. The former is the class
of equilibria with maximum unravelling, i.e., the largest U, and the latter is the class of equilibria
with minimum unravelling, i.e., the smallest U. It may happen in a market that UMAX ≡ UMIN,
19that is, that all equilibria in this market result in the same unravelling set. For instance, in any
market with G0, UMAX ≡ UMIN = ∅.
As similarity of preferences increases, both minimum and maximum equilibrium unravelling
sets increase. Let U(ρ) be an equilibrium unravelling set in a market characterized by similar-
ity of preferences ρ. Then, holding other market parameters constant, UMIN(ρ) ⊆ UMIN(ρ0) and
UMAX(ρ) ⊆ UMAX(ρ0) whenever ρ < ρ0.
As ρ increases, the maximum and minimum equilibria are more likely to be distinct. The
maximum equilibrium unravelling set increases from empty to non-empty at lower ρ than the
minimum equilibrium unravelling set does. As the maximum equilibrium unravelling set increases,
an equilibrium with unravelling appears in the market. Moreover, when similarity of preferences
increases, the minimum equilibrium unravelling set may also increase empty to non-empty. When
this occurs, “no unravelling” is no longer an equilibrium in markets with high ρ. This relationship
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Figure 4: The relationship of UMIN, UMAX and ρ in a typical market
Proposition 1. Under MS, for any market parameters F,W,u,v, there exist ρ∗ and ρ∗∗ such that












Proof. See the Appendix, page 35.
For any market parameters, there are thresholds ρ∗ and ρ∗∗ such that for preference similarity
lower than ρ∗ all equilibrium outcomes involve no unravelling; for similarity between ρ∗ and ρ∗∗, there
are equilibrium outcomes with unravelling and without unravelling; and for similarity higher than
20ρ∗∗, all equilibrium outcomes involve a nonempty unravelling set. In extreme cases, the thresholds
may be equal to 1. When ρ∗∗ = 1, the interval (ρ∗∗,1] is empty, and for any similarity of preferences
there exists an equilibrium without unravelling. Similarly, when ρ∗ = 1, then in all equilibria for
any preference similarity there is no unravelling. Moreover, ρ∗ must be strictly greater than 0. This
means that for any market parameters, all equilibria preclude unravelling if the preference similarity
is suﬃciently low.19
Discussion
This section has shown that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In
markets where ﬁrms’ preferences are very similar, strong competition for the same workers ensues
when pertinent information becomes available. Lower-ranked ﬁrms view contracting early, with less
information as their best chance of being matched with their most-preferred workers.
In some markets that have struggled with unravelling, ﬁrms have called on an outside institution,
or created one, to solve the problem.20 It is often recommended that such institutions apply the
ex-post stable mechanism once preferences are known. Roth (1991) and Kagel and Roth (2000),
for example, argue that the ex-post stable mechanism prevents unravelling. It has indeed proven
successful in halting unravelling in many markets (e.g. markets for medical interns in the US and
the UK). In other markets, however, the ex-post stable mechanism has failed to stop unravelling.
For instance, in the Canadian lawyer market and the gastroenterology market in the US, agents
contracted as early as a year before pertinent information was available and the mechanism was
applied. In the latter case, the clearinghouse was subsequently abandoned in 1996, due to too few
participants.
Proposition 1 explains why the ex-post stable matching mechanism has sometimes failed to stop
unravelling. In some markets characterized by high similarity of preferences, there exist equilibria
with and without unravelling. In those markets the ex-post stable clearinghouse could success-
fully stop unravelling, as it could help to coordinate on the no-unravelling equilibrium. In other
markets, however, all equilibria under the ex-post stable mechanism involve early contracting. In
such markets, introducing the ex-post stable clearinghouse will not stop unravelling. But it may
be possible to ﬁnd unstable matching mechanisms that can prevent unravelling in those markets.
Section 5 shows that unravelling is always Pareto-suboptimal, and that there exist Pareto-optimal
mechanisms for markets were unravelling is possible.
5 Mechanism Design
The previous section investigated unravelling when the mechanism operating in period 2 is ﬁxed to
be the ex-post stable one. This section turns to the problem of mechanism design in markets where
unravelling may occur. Clearly, some of the mechanisms constructed in this section would be hard
to apply in practice. However, they show that it is possible to ﬁnd a mechanism that would ﬁx
19This analysis assumes that matching value vector, v, is identical for all ﬁrms. When ﬁrms have diﬀerent values,
it is still true that a ﬁrm is more willing to contract early if it is ranked lower in the market than if it is ranked
higher. And more ﬁrms want to contract early (and are accepted) as preferences become more similar. However,
with diﬀerent matching values it is no longer true that the unravelling set is an interval, and that it can be easily
characterized by L and H.
20E.g., the National Resident Matching Program for the US medical-intern market, Judicial Conferences for
the federal-court clerkship market and the Articling Student Matching Program for entry-level lawyer positions
in Canada. See Roth and Xing (1994) for an extensive list.
21unravelling in markets where ex-post stable mechanism fails. These existence results are intended
as a starting point for searching for other mechanism, easier to implement in practice.
A social planner chooses a mechanism for the second period; the mechanism is announced at
the onset of the game. It is assumed that agents cannot renege on the matching produced by the
mechanism in period 2, but that they can contract in period 1. Firms decide about their early
oﬀers, and workers decide whether to accept such oﬀers, in full awareness of the mechanism that
will operate in the next period. All agents that did not contract in period 1 participate in the
mechanism in period 2. The goal of the social planner is to provide a Pareto-optimal outcome, from
the ex-ante perspective.
This section shows that unravelling is Pareto-ineﬃcient, for a broad class of mechanisms char-
acterized by a property that one would expect from a mechanism in a real market: this property
requires the mechanism to match ﬁrms and workers based on preference rankings, not on workers’
identities. A mechanism that satisﬁes this property is called an anonymous mechanism. For exam-
ple, the ex-post stable mechanism is anonymous, as are all mechanisms ever used in real markets.
It is shown here that when an anonymous mechanism induces early contracting, the outcome
may be Pareto-improved by employing some other mechanism that would not unravel. Thus, any
anonymous Pareto-optimal mechanism must preclude unravelling.
Moreover, the ex-post stable matching mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it does not
induce unravelling. This section also demonstrates that in every market there always exists a
mechanism that produces a Pareto-optimal outcome. In the markets where the ex-post stable
clearinghouse unravels, there exists an ex-post unstable mechanism that will stop unravelling and
improve the welfare of the market participants.
5.1 Notions of Pareto-Optimality
An outcome is a function from the proﬁle of rankings to randomization over matchings between all




is the set of all possible matchings
between all ﬁrms and all workers. Then an outcome o is






The previous section considered a special case of an outcome function — the ex-post stable
outcome, oS. This is the outcome in the case when all agents participate in the ex-post stable
mechanism, MS.21 This section also examines other outcomes and mechanisms.
Firm f’s payoﬀ from an outcome depends on the realized rankings, R, and is denoted by πf(o|R).
The ex-ante expected payoﬀ of an outcome is the expectation over all possible ranking realizations.
The payoﬀ and the expected payoﬀ also depend on market characteristics, especially the probability





21When unravelling occurs under the ex-post stable mechanism, the resulting outcome is other than oS.
22The probability distribution of ranking proﬁles depends on ρ. Other market characteristics also play a role
in calculating payoﬀs. However, since this section only considers outcomes and mechanisms for a given market
(employing no comparative statistics), there is no need to use notation where payoﬀs and utilities are conditional on
market characteristics.
22Similarly, let Uw(o|R) be worker w’s utility from outcome o, given the realized rankings, and





















A matching outcome o is Pareto-optimal in a given market when there does not exist an outcome
in that market that strictly Pareto-dominates o.
The goal of the social planner is to obtain the best outcome in the Pareto sense. He designs
a mechanism, which is in operation in the second period. The mechanism is already known in
period 1, when ﬁrms and workers make their decisions about early contracting. Given mechanism
M in period 2, all ﬁrms need to decide whether to contract early, and ﬁrms that participate in
M need to choose whether to report their true preferences. By the revelation principle, it may
be assumed that M is incentive compatible and that preferences are reported truthfully. For an
incentive compatible mechanism in period 2, an equilibrium under M is described by the ﬁrst-period
strategies of agents. Recall that σ denotes a vector of period 1 strategies for all agents. A mechanism
may possibly implement many equilibria. For example, it was demonstrated that the game with
the ex-post stable mechanism usually has multiple equilibria. Let Σ
M be the set of all possible
equilibria under mechanism M. A pair (M,σ), where σ ∈ Σ
M, is called a mechanism-equilibrium
pair. A mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) determines a unique outcome o(M,σ).
A mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) is unconstrained Pareto-optimal when it produces a
Pareto-optimal outcome, that is, when o(M,σ) is Pareto-optimal. However, a social planner is con-
strained to inducing outcomes by means of a mechanism. A mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) is
constrained Pareto-optimal when there is no other mechanism-equilibrium pair (M0,σ0) such that
its outcome o(M0,σ0) strictly Pareto-dominates o(M,σ). Clearly, any unconstrained Pareto-optimal
pair (M,σ) is also Pareto-optimal in the constrained sense.
Deﬁne a mechanism to be anonymous if it assigns workers to ﬁrms based only on ﬁrms’ rankings,
not on workers’ identities. For example, the ex-post stable mechanism, MS, is anonymous. Notice
that in this context anonymity refers only to the workers’ side. Identities of the ﬁrms — and thus
preferences of workers — are commonly known. Deﬁne a vector of strategies, σ, as anonymous if
any ﬁrm that contracts with a worker in period 1 selects a worker at random, ignoring his identity.24
A mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) is anonymous when M and σ are anonymous.
It seems reasonable to consider anonymous mechanism-equilibrium pairs. A priori all workers are
the same, except for their identities. But in period 2 they diﬀer in their positions in ﬁrms’ rankings.
It appears that all realistic mechanisms would match ﬁrms and workers based on the rankings, not
on identities. Moreover, if a ﬁrm matches with a worker in period 1, that early contracting reﬂects
the ﬁrm’s expectations about the worker’s eventual place in its ranking. But it does not depend
23All notions of Pareto-optimality here are from ex-ante perspective. Ex-post, every realized matching is Pareto-
optimal as long as all ﬁrms are matched to some worker.
24It is assumed, however, that no two ﬁrms that want to contract in period 1 make oﬀer to the same worker.
23on the worker’s identity, as expectations are identical for all workers. In this context, the worker’s
identity does not matter either for early contracting in period 1, or for a mechanism in period 2.
Notice that under an anonymous mechanism-equilibrium pair, every worker has the same ex-
ante expected utility at the beginning of the ﬁrst period. This utility depends on the set of ﬁrms
that get matched under the mechanism-equilibrium pair. All workers have the same probability of
being matched to any of those ﬁrms or of remaining unmatched.
It is said that a mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) exhibits unravelling when there is a positive
probability that an early oﬀer is both made and accepted under the vector of strategies σ.
5.2 Pareto-Optimality and Unravelling
The following proposition presents the main result of this section: that if an anonymous mechanism-
equilibrium pair (M,σ) exhibits unravelling, then there is another anonymous mechanism-equilibrium
pair that produces a better outcome, in the Pareto sense. That is, when an anonymous (M,σ)
exhibits unravelling, it cannot be constrained Pareto-optimal.
Proposition 2. For any anonymous mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) that exhibits unravelling,
there exists an anonymous mechanism-equilibrium pair (M0,σ0) such that it does not exhibit unrav-
elling and that outcome o(M0,σ0) strictly Pareto-dominates outcome o(M,σ).
Proof. Consider an anonymous (M,σ) such that M produces in equilibrium σ a non-empty un-
ravelling set UM 6= ∅. Now consider the following mechanism M0:
(1) To all ﬁrms in UM, M0 tentatively assigns a random worker from the set of all workers. This
mimics the unravelling outcome for those ﬁrms. Notice that with probability 1
W, a ﬁrm is
assigned to its least-preferred worker.
(2) All other ﬁrms are matched according to M. These ﬁrms get the same expected payoﬀ as
under (M,σ). For these ﬁrms it is the ﬁnal match.
(3) (the “least-preferred workers correction”) For all ﬁrms in UM that were matched to their least-
preferred workers, M0 replaces these workers with workers still remaining in the pool. This is
feasible because, after all ﬁrms are matched, there is at least one worker still in the pool. For
ﬁrm f tentatively matched with its worker r
f
1, any of the remaining workers is preferable to
the tentative match. This way, all ﬁrms tentatively matched with their least-preferred workers
can improve their payoﬀ. When there are no more ﬁrms in UM that are matched to their
least-preferred worker, the algorithm stops and the matching is ﬁnalized.
Notice that M0 is an incentive compatible mechanism. To understand how, recall that M is
incentive compatible. For all ﬁrms that did participate in the original M, the incentives to truthfully
report their preferences did not change. Firms in UM that participate in M0 cannot gain by
misreporting their preferences, and they can even lose if they misreport their least-preferred worker.
Notice too that M0 is anonymous, since M is anonymous.
There is an equilibrium without unravelling under M0. This is the case because all ﬁrms in UM
prefer to wait for M0 rather than to unravel given that other ﬁrms wait for period 2. Since ﬁrms
outside UM did not unravel when some other ﬁrms were contracting early — either because they
preferred not to or because they would not be accepted in period 1 — they do not unravel when all
other ﬁrms wait for period 2 under M0. For ﬁrms that preferred not to unravel under (M,σ), the
value of waiting does not change under M0. For the workers, the value of waiting for the mechanism
24is strictly higher when no ﬁrm unravels (since M0 is anonymous, additional ﬁrms participating in
the mechanism yield higher expected utility to every worker). So the ﬁrms that were not accepted
under (M,σ) are not accepted under M0 either. Therefore, no unravelling occurs. Denote the
equilibrium without unravelling by σ0.
Notice that since (M,σ) is anonymous, (M0,σ0) is anonymous as well. And since every ﬁrm that
is matched to a worker under (M,σ) is also matched under (M0,σ0), the expected payoﬀ to every
worker does not change. Every ﬁrm in UM has a strictly higher expected payoﬀ in o(M0,σ0) than
in o(M,σ). All the other ﬁrms have exactly the same expected payoﬀ in both outcomes. Therefore,
o(M0,σ0) Pareto-dominates o(M,σ).
5.3 The Role of Anonymity
To understand the role that the assumption of anonymity plays in Proposition 2, consider following
example.
Example 6. Consider a non-anonymous mechanism-equilibrium pair (M,σ) where M assigns
ﬁrm 1 to worker 1, ﬁrm 2 to worker 2, etc., and in σ ﬁrm F contracts early with worker F and all
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Notice that, despite unravelling in equilibrium, this outcome cannot be Pareto-improved. In partic-
ular, it cannot be improved by the equilibrium without unravelling. This is because any change in
allocation would make some worker worse oﬀ. 
Anonymity is an important assumption for the result in Proposition 2. However, it also seems
reasonable to consider anonymous mechanisms the most plausible for implementation in real mar-
kets.
5.4 Other Results on Pareto-Optimality
Proposition 2 establishes that no-unravelling is a necessary condition for constrained Pareto-optimality
of an anonymous (M,σ). In particular, when the ex-post stable mechanism — which is anonymous
— unravels, it cannot be constrained Pareto-optimal. Moreover, for the ex-post stable mechanism,
any (MS,σ) that does not exhibit unravelling is unconstrained Pareto-optimal. It has been already
established in the literature that the ex-post stable outcome is always Pareto-optimal.25 When the
ex-post stable mechanism does not unravel, it produces the ex-post stable outcome and, thus, it is
unconstrained (and constrained) Pareto-optimal.
Corollary 1. A mechanism-equilibrium pair with the ex-post stable mechanism (MS,σ) is con-
strained and unconstrained Pareto-optimal if and only if there is no unravelling in σ.
25E.g., see Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
25When MS does not unravel, the market achieves an unconstrained Pareto-optimal outcome.
However, there are markets where MS always unravels. Proposition 2 implies that in those markets
there must exist an ex-post unstable mechanism that does not unravel and that Pareto-improves
the unravelling outcome.
Proposition 3 guarantees that in any market there exists an unconstrained Pareto-optimal
mechanism-equilibrium pair, i.e., one that produces a Pareto-optimal outcome.
Proposition 3. For any market, there exists a mechanism M and an equilibrium σ ∈ Σ
M such
that (M,σ) is unconstrained Pareto-optimal.
Proof. Consider a mechanism M that ﬁrst randomly assigns all participating ﬁrms a number be-
tween 1 and F. Then the mechanism works in the same way as the ex-post stable mechanism but
the order in which ﬁrms are matched with workers is based on the randomly assigned numbers, not
on their position in the market.
Notice that this mechanism is anonymous. It is also incentive compatible, as is the ex-post stable
mechanism. Moreover, there exists an equilibrium without unravelling. If all agents participate
in the mechanism, then all ﬁrms have higher expected payoﬀs from the mechanism than from
unravelling. Thus, no ﬁrm wants to unravel when no other ﬁrm unravels. Denote the no-unravelling
equilibrium as σ.
Now, notice that (M,σ) produces a Pareto-optimal outcome. The sum of workers’ expected
utilities and the sum of ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀs are the same under (M,σ) as they are under oS.
Since oS is Pareto-optimal, so must o(M,σ) be: in both outcomes it is impossible to increase the
expected payoﬀ for one agent without decreasing it for some other agent on the same side of the
market.
Thus, if (MS,σ) exhibits unravelling, the social planner can implement another mechanism
that achieves a Pareto-optimal outcome. Notice, however, that the Pareto-optimal outcome as
constructed in the proof of the proposition above does not Pareto-improve on a (MS,σ) that
exhibits unravelling.
Nonetheless, following observation shows that whenever (MS,σ) exhibits unravelling, the mech-
anism may be modiﬁed in such a way that not only is there no unravelling and the outcome is
Pareto-optimal but the outcome also strictly Pareto-improves upon (MS,σ). The modiﬁcation of
the mechanism uses a construction similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
Observation. If (MS,σ) exhibits unravelling, there exists an unconstrained Pareto-optimal (M0,σ0)
that strictly Pareto-improves on (MS,σ).
This result is shown by construction. When (MS,σ) unravels, it produces a non-empty unrav-
elling set, U 6= ∅. Now consider the following mechanism, denoted MA:
(1) All ﬁrms f ∈ U draw a random number out of {1,...,W}.26
(2) All other ﬁrms f ∈ {1,...,F}rU, in order from the highest-ranked to the lowest-ranked, get
the highest number that is still available.
(3) Firms get matched with their most-preferred available worker in order of their numbers,
starting with the highest number. That is, the ﬁrm with the highest number is treated as
26Notice that the number is drawn from the index numbers of workers, not just ﬁrms. (There are more workers
than ﬁrms.)
26ﬁrm F in the ex-post stable matching, the ﬁrm with the second-highest number is treated as
ﬁrm (F − 1), and so on, ending with the ﬁrm with the lowest number, which is treated as
ﬁrm 1 in the ex-post stable matching.
This mechanism is incentive compatible, as is the ex-post stable mechanism. Moreover, there exists
an equilibrium without unravelling under MA. Denote this equilibrium by σA. Let oA be the
outcome of (MA,σA). Outcome oA is Pareto-optimal. To understand why, notice that the sum of
expected payoﬀs to ﬁrms and the sum of expected utilities to workers are the same under oA as
under oS. Since oS is Pareto-optimal, oA is as well: in both outcomes it is impossible to increase
the expected payoﬀ for one agent without decreasing it for some other agent.
Moreover, outcomeoA Pareto-improves on the outcomeo(MS,σ). Since (MA,σA) is anonymous,
the expected utility of workers is the same under both outcomes. Firms in U clearly have higher
expected utility under oA. Other ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀ does not change. This is the case because
the numbers that U-ﬁrms draw in step (1) are mathematically equivalent, from the payoﬀ point of
view, to the workers removed from the market in period 1 when they match early with U-ﬁrms.
6 Conclusions
This study investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching
markets. It considers a two-period model in which ﬁrms receive pertinent information about workers
and specify preferences over them at the beginning of the second period. It is assumed that ﬁrms and
workers can make and accept oﬀers during the ﬁrst period if they wish to, and that a clearinghouse
mechanism is used in the second period to assign workers to the remaining ﬁrms. Unravelling is said
to occur when oﬀers are both made and accepted in the ﬁrst period. Notice that ﬁrms that choose
to contract early do so in the absence of information about which workers are most-preferred.
Section 4 explores the issue of unravelling when the ex-post stable mechanism operates in the
second period. Ex-post stable matching is the clearinghouse mechanism that most of the existing
literature focuses on. Section 4 shows that unravelling becomes more likely as ﬁrms’ preferences
over workers grow more similar. This is the case because when ﬁrms’ preferences are very similar,
lower-ranked ﬁrms can be matched with their most-preferred worker only by contracting with them
early. Despite insuﬃcient information in the ﬁrst period, it may be worthwhile for such ﬁrms to
bear the risk and contract early. The ﬁrms most likely to unravel are those “in the middle” — bad
enough to prefer the uncertainty of early contracting but good enough to be accepted.
Section 5 investigates the impact of diﬀerent mechanisms on the equilibrium outcome and their
welfare consequences. The goal of this analysis is to characterize Pareto-optimal mechanisms, given
that ﬁrms and workers can choose to contract in the ﬁrst period if they wish to. The main result
demonstrates that a necessary condition for an anonymous mechanism to be Pareto-optimal is that
it does not induce unravelling. Any anonymous mechanism that induces unravelling is Pareto-
suboptimal. In particular, the ex-post stable matching mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if
it does not unravel.
Another result of Section 5 demonstrates that in every market there exists a mechanism that
produces a Pareto-optimal outcome. In markets where the ex-post stable clearinghouse unravels, it
is an ex-post unstable mechanism that achieves Pareto-optimality.
These ﬁndings are particularly noteworthy given the importance that the literature assigns to
stability. In some circumstances, an ex-post unstable mechanism that precludes unravelling is
actually preferable from a policy standpoint.
27Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (page 12)
First, note that the probability that ﬁrm f is matched with its kth worker in the ex-post stable outcome
under independent preferences is:
P(W,f,k) ≡
(F − f)!
(F − W − f + k)!
(k − 1)!
W!
(W − F + f)
This formula is derived by applying combinatorics formulas.27
(1) Proof. The probability that ﬁrm f − 1 gets its worker k > W − F + f is
(1 − ρ) · P(W,f − 1,k) = (1 − ρ)
(F − f + 1)!
(F − W − f + 1 + k)!
(k − 1)!
W!
(W − F + f − 1) =
= (1 − ρ) · P(W,f,k) ·
F − f + 1
F − W − f + 1 + k
W − F + f − 1
W − F + f
Since F, f and W are ﬁxed, the ratio in the formula decreases with increasing k. It is more probable
for the better ﬁrm to be matched with its more-preferred workers. Formally, the inequality in
expected payoﬀs of ﬁrms f and f − 1 follows from FOSD.
(2) Proof. Eπf(oS|ρ) =
PW
k=1 vk · Prob(oS(f) = r
f
k|ρ) = ρ · Eπf(oS|G1) + (1 − ρ)Eπf(oS|G0)
because Prob(oS(f) = r
f
k|ρ) = ρ · Prob(oS(f) = r
f






vk · P(W,f,k) > vW−F+f
W X
k=W−F+f
·P(W,f,k) = vW−F+f = Eπf(oS|G1)
Let ρ0 > ρ, then
Eπf(oS|ρ0) =
= ρ · Eπf(oS|G1) + (1 − ρ)Eπf(oS|G0) + (ρ0 − ρ)[Eπf(oS|G1) − Eπf(oS|G0)] <
< Eπf(oS|ρ)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2 (page 14)
Proof. Consider the worst ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1.
Prob(oS(f = 1) = r1
k|G0,W) ≡ P(W,1,k) =
(F − 1)!
(F − W − 1 + k)!
(k − 1)!
W!
(W − F + 1)
for k = (W − F + 1),...,W
and 0 for k < W − F + 1.
By induction, it can be shown that P(W,1,k) > P(W,1,k0) for k > k0. Therefore, distribution
P(W,1,k) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates distribution P0(W,1,k) = 1
W for any k, which is the distri-
bution for early matches. Thus, Eπ1(oS|G0) > π0 in any market with G0.
By Lemma 1(1) for any ﬁrm better than ﬁrm 1, the payoﬀ from the ex-post stable outcome is higher.
Therefore, all ﬁrms prefer to wait for oS rather than to unravel.
27Derivation of this formula is available at author’s website.
28Proof of Lemma 3 (page 16)
Proof. Fix an arbitrary market parameters (W,F,u,v). An equilibrium without unravelling exists when
H0 < L0. L0 does not depend on ρ. H0 is monotonic in ρ, i.e.
ρ < ρ0 =⇒ H0
(ρ,v) ≤ H0
(ρ0,v)
This follows from the fact that Eπf(oS |ρ)’s decrease as ρ increases, by Lemma 1(2).
By Lemma 2, for ρ = 0, H0
(G0,v) < 1, so H0
(G0,v) < L0 always holds.
For ρ = 1 it must be either H0
(G1,v) < L0 or L0 ≤ H0
(G1,v). If H0
(G1,v) < L0, then ρ∗∗ = 1 and for all
ρ ∈ [0,1] there exists an equilibrium without unravelling.
If L0 ≤ H0
(G1,v), then by the monotonicity of H0 there must exists ρ∗∗ such that
H0(ρ) < L0 for all ρ ≤ ρ∗∗
and L0 ≤ H0(ρ) for all ρ > ρ∗∗
Proof of Lemma 4 (page 19)
(1) interval property:
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists a ﬁrm f such that H∗ > f > L∗ and f 6∈ U∗. If
the ﬁrm is not in U∗, it either prefers to wait or would not be accepted in period 1.
Since L∗ is accepted in period 1, given that all the other ﬁrms in U∗ contracting early, then EU(t =
2|U∗r{L∗}) < uL∗; EU(t = 2|U) denotes expected utility of a worker in period 2 matching if U is
the set of unravelling ﬁrms. But if an acceptable ﬁrm contracts in period 1, the expected utility of
period 2 matching decreases for workers:
EU(t = 2|U∗r{L∗}) < uL∗ =⇒ EU(t = 2|U∗) < EU(t = 2|U∗r{L∗})
Moreover, uL∗ < uf. Thus, EU(t = 2|U∗) < uf. Therefore, f would be accepted by a worker in
period 1.
Since ﬁrm H∗ prefers to contract early, given all the other ﬁrms in U∗ contracting in period 1,
EπH∗(MS|U∗r{H∗}) < π0
where Eπf(MS|U) represents the expected payoﬀ to ﬁrm f from the ex-post stable mechanism
operating in period 2 given that ﬁrms in U unravel.
Notice that28
EπH∗(MS|U∗r{H∗}) ≥ Eπf(MS|U∗r{L∗})
Since the expected payoﬀ from period 2 matching decreases when an additional worse ﬁrm unravels:29
Eπf(MS|U∗) < Eπf(MS|U∗r{L∗})
Together, these inequalities yield Eπf(MS|U∗) < π0. Therefore, f prefers to contract in period 1
rather than wait.
Hence, the contradiction.
28This is for the following reason. Let nH be the number of ﬁrms better than H∗. Let nU be the number of ﬁrms
in U∗. And let n0 be the number of ﬁrms better than f which do not belong to U∗; notice that n0 ≥ nH. When ﬁrms
in U∗r{H∗} unravel, H∗ is in the second period mechanism the (nH + 1)-th ﬁrm from the top with nU − 1 ﬁrms
unravelling. When ﬁrms in U∗r{L∗} unravel, f is in the second period the (n0 +1)-th ﬁrm from the top with nU −1
ﬁrms unravelling. That is no better position than H∗’s in the former situation.
29This is because this worse ﬁrm can match with a “too-good” worker, which would cause f to match with a worse
worker than if this worse ﬁrm had not unraveled. There is no potential beneﬁts for f from a worse ﬁrm unravelling.
29(2) existence of pure strategy equilibrium: Given H∗, the equilibrium condition for workers (CW)
characterizes L∗, i.e., the worst ﬁrm that would be accepted in period 1.



















The worst ﬁrm that would be accepted in period 1, given H∗, is characterized by two inequalities:30
uL∗ >
1

























The ﬁrst part of equilibrium condition (CW) indicates that if ﬁrms L∗+1,...,H∗ contract early,
then ﬁrm L∗ would also be accepted in period 1. The second part of the condition assures that L∗ is
the lowest-ranked ﬁrm that would be accepted in period 1, given H∗. That is, the worse ﬁrm L∗−1
is not accepted in period 1, when ﬁrms L∗,...,H∗ contract early.
Given L∗, the equilibrium condition for ﬁrms (CF) characterizes H∗, i.e., the best ﬁrm contracting












where Eπf(MS|U) represents the expected payoﬀ to ﬁrm f from the ex-post stable matching mech-
anism in period 2, given that ﬁrms in U contract in period 1, and U(L,H) is a shorthand for
U = {L,...,H}. In the case of H∗ = L∗, U(L∗,H∗ − 1) = ∅.
The ﬁrst part of equilibrium condition (CF) says that ﬁrm H∗ prefers to contract early, given that
ﬁrms L∗,...,(H∗ −1) do so. The second part of the condition assures that H∗ is the highest-ranked
ﬁrm that wants to contract early. That is, better ﬁrm (H∗+1) prefers to wait until period 2, given
that ﬁrms L∗,...,H∗ unravel. Because of the monotonicity of the expected payoﬀs in the ex-post
stable matching, this also means that, given L∗, all ﬁrms worse than H∗ prefer to contract early,
and all ﬁrms better than H∗ prefer to wait.
There exists an equilibrium with nonempty unravelling set U∗ = {L∗,...,H∗} if and only if
(cf) given L∗, H∗ satisﬁes condition (CF), and
(cw) given H∗, L∗ satisﬁes condition (CW).
30More precisely, the ﬁrst inequality is
uL∗ >
1













but if all uL∗ terms are moved to the LHS, the equivalent inequality is as above.
30If in a market there exists an equilibrium without unravelling, i.e. L0
(F,u) > H0
(ρ,v), then the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium is satisﬁed.
To prove the existence for the case when L0
(F,u) ≤ H0
(ρ,v), notice the following:
There is a unique L satisfying condition (CW) for given H. Moreover, this L is decreasing as H
increases. Similarly, there is a unique H satisfying condition (CF) for given L. This H increases as
L decreases.
Those properties are formally stated in following lemmas.
Lemma 5. In a given market (F,W,u,v,ρ,M), for any ﬁrm H∗, there exists unique L(H∗) that
satisﬁes condition (CW) under H∗.
Proof. Consider a market (F,W,u,v,ρ,M) and an arbitrary ﬁrm H∗.
It must be that either
















In case (B) no ﬁrm worse than H∗ would be accepted in t = 1, if ﬁrms better than H∗ do not unravel.













Firm L that satisﬁes this condition is L0
(F,u) (and it must be that L0
(F,u) > H∗). Thus for this case
L(H∗) exists and is unique.
In case (A), again, it must be that either















In case (ii) all ﬁrms worse than H∗ (including H∗) would be accepted in t = 1. For this special case







since ﬁrm 1 is the lowest-ranked ﬁrm that is accepted in t = 1 given that H∗ is the highest-ranked
ﬁrm making oﬀers in t = 1. Thus, L(H∗) in this case exists and is unique.
For the remaining case (Ai), L(H∗) exists because
ui >
1










 ⇐⇒ ui >
1











31To prove that L(H∗) is unique, assume — to the contrary — that two distinct L∗ and L0, lower-
ranked than H∗ (but higher-ranked than ﬁrm 1), satisfy (CW) given H∗. Without loss of generality,
L0 < L∗ ≤ H∗, i.e., uL0 < uL∗. Then,
uL∗ >
1






















































uL0−1 ≤ EU(t = 2|U(L0,H∗)) < uL0 ≤ uL∗−1 ≤ EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗)) < uL∗ (3)







So the ﬁrms left for t = 2 are on average worse under {L∗,H∗} than under {L0,H∗}; i.e. EU(t =
2|U(L0,H∗)) > EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗)).31 Hence, a contradiction.
Lemma 6. If H0 > H∗ then L(H0) < L(H∗).
Proof. Let L0 ≡ L(H0) and L∗ ≡ L(H∗).
Assume, to the contrary, L0 > L∗; so uL0 > uL∗ and ∆L = L0 − L∗ > 0. The corresponding
31To show this formally, let n0 = W −H∗ +L0 −1 and ∆L = L∗ −L0 > 0. Then W −H∗ +L∗ −1 = n0 +∆L and





































uf = n0 · EU(t = 2|U(L0,H∗)) ⇐⇒




(EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗)) − uf)
From the equilibrium condition for U∗, EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗)) > uL∗−1. Thus all terms in the sum on the RHS are














 = EU(t = 2|U(L0,H0))
uL0−l ≤
1
























 = EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗))
uL∗−l ≤
1












uL∗−1 ≤ EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗) < uL∗ ≤ uL0−1 ≤ EU(t = 2|U(L0,H0)) < uL0
Let ∆H = H0 − H∗ > 0 and γ = H∗ − L0 + 1. Then
EU(t = 2|U(L∗,H∗)) =
1














EU(t = 2|U(L0,H0)) =
1












































EU(t = 2|(L∗,H∗)) − EU(t = 2|U(L0,H0))

(W − γ) =
= EU(t = 2|(L∗,H∗))∆L +
H0 X
f=H∗+1





EU(t = 2|(L∗,H∗)) − EU(t = 2|U(L0,H0))








uf − EU(t = 2|U(L0,H0))(∆H − ∆L)
| {z }
(N)
Formula (N) is always positive. This is because for all f ∈ {L∗,...,L0−1}, uf < EU(t = 2|(L0,H0))
and for all f ∈ {H∗ + 1,...,H0}, uf > EU(t = 2|(L0,H0)). Thus
H0 X
H∗+1
uf > ∆H · EU(t = 2|(L0,H0)) and
L0−1 X
L∗







uf > EU(t = 2|(L0,H0))(∆H − ∆L)
Similar properties are also true for the ﬁrms’ condition (CF).
Lemma 7. In a given market (F,W,u,v,ρ,M), for any ﬁrm L∗, there exists unique H(L∗) that
satisﬁes condition (CF) under L∗.










where equality holds for ρ = 0, and strict inequality holds otherwise.
This must be true because of the following reasoning: Firm f+1 has F−(f+1) ﬁrms better than itself,
and f−L∗+1 ﬁrms that unravel. Firm f has F −f ﬁrms better than itself, and f−1−L∗+1 = f−L∗
ﬁrms that unravel. Under ρ = 0, it is as if ﬁrm f + 1 was f + 1 − (f − L∗ + 1) = L∗ ﬁrm in oS.
Similarly, ﬁrm f is as if it was f −(f −L∗) = L∗ ﬁrm in oS. Thus under ρ = 0 their payoﬀs are the
same. Under independent preferences, if ﬁrm f0 — higher-ranked than ﬁrm f — unravels, it results
in exactly the same expected payoﬀ to ﬁrm f as if both would wait until the ex-post stable matching.
Under ρ = 1, it is better to have one more ﬁrm unravel rather than to have one ﬁrm that is higher
ranked and doesn’t unravel and for sure will be matched with a more preferred worker. Thus, under
ρ = 1 the inequality holds strictly. Because other ρ’s are the convex combination of ρ = 0 and ρ = 1,
the strict inequality in (6) holds for ρ > 0.
Now, given L∗, it must be that either
(A) there exists ﬁrm f ≥ L∗ such that Eπf(MS |U = ∅) < π0, or
(B) for all f ≥ L∗, Eπf(MS |U = ∅) ≥ π0.
In the latter case, no ﬁrm higher ranked than L∗ would prefer to contract early. In such a case there
would be no unravelling. Condition (CF) in this special case takes on the form
EπH(MS |U = ∅) < π0
EπH+1(MS |U = ∅) ≥ π0
Firm H that satisﬁes this condition is H0
(ρ,v) (and it must be that H0
(ρ,v) < L∗). Thus, for this case
H(L∗) exists and is unique.
34Now, consider the case (A). We know that the best ﬁrm never wants to contract early, even when
all the other ﬁrms are unravelling (this follows from the assumption that W > F). Thus,
EπF(MS |U(L∗,F − 1)) ≥ π0
Together with the monotonicity condition (6), there must exist a unique H∗ such that satisﬁes
condition (CF) given L∗. This is H(L∗).
Lemma 8. If L0 > L∗ then H(L0) < H(L∗).
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that H(L0) > H(L∗). Then the proof follows the proof of Lemma 6.
Given Lemmas 5–8, we can proceed to prove the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies for the
case where L0
(F,u) ≤ H0
(ρ,v). Let H1 = H(L0
(F,u)) and L1 = L(H0
(ρ,v)), and further Hi+1 = H(Li) and
Li+1 = L(Hi).
Because of the monotonicity and uniqueness results in the lemmas above, it must be that there exist
H∗ and L∗ such that H∗(L∗) and L∗(H∗). To see that, notice that by the monotonicity results in
Lemmas 6 and 8: L1 = L(H0) ≤ L0 and H1 = H(L0) ≥ H0. Further, L2 = L(H1) ≤ L(H0) = L1
since H1 ≥ H0. And so for any i, Li+1 ≤ Li and Hi+1 ≥ Hi. Either this iteration stops for some i
where Hi+1 = Hi and Li+1 = Li and so Hi = H∗ = H(L∗) and Li = L∗ = L(H∗), i.e H∗ and L∗
are equilibrium values; or it continues until it reaches the extreme case L∗ = 1 and H∗ = H(L∗).
Thus, an equilibrium exists.
(3) multiple equilibria:
Proof. This property follows directly from Lemmas 5–8.
Lemmas 5 and 7 show that it cannot be that two diﬀerent equilibrium unravelling sets would have
the same L or the same H.
Lemmas 6 and 8 show that “overlapping” equilibrium unravelling sets are not possible.
Thus the only possibility for two diﬀerent unravelling sets is for one to be completely included in the
other.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 1 (page 20)
Proof. First, notice that in any market with G0, (F,W,u,v,G0), the only equilibrium outcome is U∗ = ∅.
To see why it must be so, assume, to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium with U∗ 6= ∅ under
G0. Then for any f ∈ U∗, it must be that Eπf(µ
F,W
S |G0,η) < Eπ(t = 1), where η is the number of ﬁrms
that unravel and are higher-ranked than f. But Eπf(µ
F,W
S |G0,η) ≡ Eπf−η(oS|G0) (for f − η ≥ 1, which
is always satisﬁed). By Lemma 2, for any i ≥ 1, Eπi(oS|G0) > Eπ(t = 1). So it must also be true for
i ≡ f − η. Therefore, a contradiction and thus the only equilibrium outcome under G0 is U∗ = ∅.
The rest of the proof follows from the fact that UMIN ⊆ UMAX and monotonicity of H0(ρ,v) and
Eπf(µ
F,W
S |ρ) in ρ. The part for ρ∗∗ is proven in Lemma 3. For ρ∗, notice that for any market parameters
(F,W,u,v) under identical preferences, G1, it must be that either UMAX = ∅, or UMAX 6= ∅. In the former
case, ρ∗ = 1 satisﬁes the Proposition.
In the latter case, let UMAX = {LMAX,HMAX}. From condition (CF) must be that
EπHMA X(MS |UMAXr{HMAX},G1) < π0
35By monotonicity of Eπf in ρ, for ρ < 1
EπHMA X(MS |UMAXr{HMAX},ρ) > EπHMA X(MS |UMAXr{HMAX},G1)
And we also know that
EπHMA X(MS |UMAXr{HMAX},G0) > π0
Thus, there must exist a threshold value ρ0 such that
EπHMA X(MS |UMAXr{HMAX},ρ)
(
< π0 if ρ > ρ0
≥ π0 if ρ ≤ ρ0
i.e. for similarity of preferences lower than ρ0, HMAX does not belong to UMAX.
Similarly, there exists a threshold ρ00 such that ﬁrm HMAX−1 does not belong to UMAX for ρ ≤ ρ00.
And so on. Thus, there must be a threshold value ρ∗ such that there is no ﬁrm that belongs to UMAX
under ρ ≤ ρ∗, but UMAX is nonempty for similarity of preferences higher than ρ∗.
Values of ρ∗ and ρ∗∗ may be the same or diﬀerent. But by deﬁnitions of UMIN and UMAX it is not
possible that ρ∗ > ρ∗∗.
Thus, Proposition 1 holds.
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